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INTRODUCTION
Most Americans agree that the current health care system is broken,1 since
health care costs have dramatically increased over the past several decades,
continue to climb, and show no sign of relenting in their ascent.2 However,
while health care costs have increased, the number of people who have ade-
quate health insurance has decreased to record lows.3 These startling trends
serve as a call to fix the health care system to save families and governments
from financial peril.
Agreeing that the health care system is broken, however, does not translate
into a broad consensus of how to fix it. On March 23, 2010, President Barack
Obama culminated a contentious legislative battle by signing into law the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).4 While the battle sur-
rounding PPACA’s passage has ended, the contentious debate about PPACA’s
substance rages on. Opponents are challenging the constitutionality of PPACA
in federal courts.5 In Congress, some are attempting to defund portions of
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2012.  Special thanks to my wife,
our parents, and our children for their continued love, support, and patience.  I also
appreciate Kammi Rencher for her strong editorial support and the other members of the
Nevada Law Journal staff for their dedicated efforts relating to this Note.
1 Lydia Saad, Americans Rate National and Personal Healthcare Differently, GALLUP (Dec.
4, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/112813/americans-rate-national-personal-healthcare-
differently.aspx.
2 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CAUSES, IMPLICATIONS, AND STRAT-
EGIES 1–5 (1991), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7665/91-CBO-001.pdf;
see also PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, THE FACTORS FUELING RISING HEALTHCARE COSTS
2 (2002), available at http://www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/PwCFinalReport.pdf.
3 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-238, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 22 (2010).
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
5 See, e.g., Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d
1256 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States was granted in this case on November 14, 2011. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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PPACA.6 Meanwhile, congressional opponents have vowed to repeal and
replace PPACA.7 In the midst of this sharp debate, President Obama has pub-
licly recognized that PPACA is not perfect, and has expressed his amenability
to legislation that might further health care reform.8
This Note presents a viable and relatively simple solution to fixing the
broken health care system, either by replacing or amending PPACA—an
expansion of health insurance exchanges to more comprehensive health care
exchanges. Health care exchanges (“HCE”) would combine a health insurance
exchange with a health provider exchange,9 and would reward consumers that
focus on value.10 HCEs would fix the health care system and deliver the major
commitments and goals of both proponents and opponents of PPACA, which
are: 1) lower overall health care costs, 2) lower health insurance premiums, 3)
increase the number of people covered by adequate health insurance, 4) remove
the pre-existing conditions barrier to adequate health insurance for nearly all
individuals, and 5) allow individuals to keep the doctor and health insurance
plan of their choice.11 In addition to these lofty benefits, HCEs could also
empower consumers; increase accountability of health insurance providers
(“insurance providers”), health care providers (“doctors”), and patients or cus-
tomers (“consumers”); reduce non-productive billing practices and negotiations
between doctors and insurance providers; allow portability of health insurance
plans; and reward good participation while punishing bad behavior.
HCEs would likely have broad bipartisan support because they would
accomplish bipartisan goals instead of focusing on the contentious political
debate of whether government or market control is more productive to fix the
6 N.C. Aizenman, House GOP Begins Drive to Defund Health-Care Overhaul, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 2011, at A02.
7 Albert R. Hunt, Vow to Repeal Health Care Holds Little Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/22/us/22iht-letter.html (noting “House Republicans’
‘Pledge to America’ vowed ‘to repeal and replace the government takeover of health care’”).
8 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 5,
2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address) (“Now, I have heard rumors that a few of you still
have concerns about our new health care law. . . . So let me be the first to say that anything
can be improved. . . . We can start right now by correcting a flaw in the legislation . . . .”).
9 The idea of a health provider exchange is a new concept. Similar to a health insurance
exchange, a health provider exchange would bring market participants together to assist con-
sumers in selecting a doctor.
10 See John F. Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, Making Markets Work: Five
Steps to a Better Health Care System, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1447, 1453 (2005). See generally
Thomas Bodenheimer, The Political Divide in Health Care: A Liberal Perspective, 24
HEALTH AFF. 1426, 1443 (2005). Insurance exchanges alone, while helpful, are unlikely to
fix the health care system because they only address the cost of insurance premiums. To
truly fix the health care system, policy makers need to address the cost of health care ser-
vices as well and the cost of insurance premiums. Insurance exchanges put downward pres-
sure on the cost of insurance premiums through increased competition; however, the rising
cost of health care services put upward pressure on the cost of insurance premiums. There-
fore, to truly fix the health care system, policy makers need to put downward pressure on
both the costs of insurance premiums and the cost of health care services.
11 See Sarah Nightingale, Obama’s Health Care Reform Plan Targets Eight Goals, LUB-
BOCK AVALANCHE-J., Aug. 23, 2009, available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/082309/
loc_485065725.shtml; Statement of Purpose, THE HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.
org/Initiatives/Health-Care (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
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broken health care system.12 Progressives generally argue that government con-
trol is more productive.13 They argue that increased regulation enables the gov-
ernment to force health care costs down to sustainable levels and fix the broken
health care industry.14 On the other side, conservatives argue that markets are
more productive,15 and that increased regulation only increases health care
costs and further breaks the health care system.16 They argue that removing
regulations would reduce health care costs and fix the health care system.17
Both sides are right, and both sides are wrong. Because the health care system
is broken, and health care is an atypical product, government intervention is
needed to organize health care into a properly functioning market. Yet, once the
market incentives are properly aligned, government intervention decreases or
destroys the market’s ability to deliver effective results because decisions
would be made based on politics instead of economics.
Instead, HCEs focus on who is at fault for increasing health care costs.
Doctors blame insurance providers for not adequately reimbursing them for
services provided.18 Insurance providers blame doctors for over-charging and
performing unnecessary care.19 Doctors and insurance providers blame con-
sumers for being uninsured.20 Consumers blame insurance providers for reduc-
ing coverage and raising premiums.21
Who really is at fault: insurance providers, doctors, or consumers? In real-
ity, they are all at fault—yet none are fully to blame. For the most part, each
participant acts according to the incentives of the current health care system.
Consumers want the best available care while paying the least amount, doctors
want to improve consumers’ health while making a sufficient profit to survive
as a business, and insurance providers want to decrease health care costs to
ensure solvency and profitability. This Note will explain why these incentives,
while individually good and necessary, are misaligned.
After discussing the current health care system in Part II, this Note will
explore the possible health care system under HCEs in Part III. Part IV will
12 See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 10; Cogan, Hubbard & Kessler, supra note 10.
13 See Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1427 (“In the health care arena, many liberals feel
that governments . . . are the only social institutions that can implement the balance between
the needs of each individual and those of all individuals—that is, the community.”).
14 Id. at 1434.
15 See id. at 1428 (“[C]onservatives . . . promote a laissez-faire economy with minimal
government intervention.”); Cogan, Hubbard & Kessler, supra note 10, at 1447.
16 See Cogan, Hubbard & Kessler, supra note 10, at 1448 (noting that government policy
“has contributed to the spread of wasteful (inefficient) medical practice, rising health care
costs, and rising rates of uninsurance”).
17 See Connie Marshner, Health Insurance Reform: What Families Should Know, THE HER-
ITAGE FOUND. (December 13, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/research/HealthCare/wm1739.
cfm.
18 See Cristina Olson, Note, Desperate Doctors and Antitrust Laws: The Best Ways for
Lawmakers to Simulate Physician Collective Bargaining, 10 NEV. L.J. 811, 813–14 (2010).
19 Victoria Colliver, Disagreement About Reasons for Rising Costs, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 19,
2011, at A1.
20 See generally Brief for the American Hosp. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners with Respect to the Individual Mandate, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Florida, No. 11-398, 2012 WL 16232 (Jan. 13, 2012).
21 Robert J. Blendon et al., The Beliefs And Values Shaping Today’s Health Reform Debate,
13 HEALTH AFF. 274, 284 (1994).
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discuss the roles of federal and state governments in establishing and maintain-
ing HCEs, and Part V will briefly conclude.
II. THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
A. Overview
According to a 1919 study, the biggest loss stemming from illness was lost
wages.22 Today, in contrast, health care costs are so substantial that the inabil-
ity to pay medical bills often forces Americans into bankruptcy.23 Because
health care costs have dramatically increased over the past several decades,
medical bills have become a financial threat to Americans.24
In addition to threatening the financial stability of Americans, the increas-
ing costs of health care threaten the financial stability of federal and state gov-
ernments. Acting as a safety net to society, federal and state governments
provide funding for health insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid.25
As health care costs increase, governments are directly affected by the
increased cost of providing insurance coverage.26 The government is also indi-
rectly affected by rising health care costs because more people enroll in govern-
ment health insurance programs as private health insurance becomes more
expensive.27
With rising health care costs threatening the financial stability of families
and governments, one important question must be answered: Why are health
care costs rising so dramatically? While many individual factors contribute to
rising health care costs, the most significant reason is because the current health
care system lacks incentives to increase value by lowering costs and increasing
quality.28 To illustrate this lack of incentive, this section will discuss current
trends regarding how consumers obtain health insurance, how consumers select
doctors, and why consumers often ignore the economic value of health care
services.
B. Obtaining Health Insurance
In 2009, just over half of Americans (55.8 percent) gained access to health
insurance under employment-based health insurance.29 Employers began offer-
22 REPORT OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 15–17
(1919).
23 David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a
National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 743 (2009) (stating that “[i]llness or medical bills
contributed to 62.1 [percent] of all bankruptcies in 2007”).
24 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1–5.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 24.
28 See generally Jason D. Fodeman & Robert A. Book, “Bending the Curve”: What Really
Drives Health Care Spending, BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 17, 2010, available at www.heritage.
org/Research/HealthCare/bg2369.cfm; Heidi Ellen Kluber, Rising Healthcare Costs in the
United States: Contributing Factors and Potential Solutions (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/honorprog/88 (unpublished honors thesis, Texas State
University).
29 DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 24.
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ing health insurance benefits during the wage freezes of the 1940s to incen-
tivize and attract employees.30 Offering health insurance benefits quickly
became the norm for large businesses because of the tax incentives provided by
the federal government.31
Employment-based health insurance provides consumers with significant
benefits. In addition to receiving financial assistance to obtain coverage, con-
sumers benefit from employment-based health insurance by pooling risk with a
group.32 Pooling risk provides bargaining power, which results in lower overall
costs and allows consumers with poor health histories to obtain health insur-
ance where they might not otherwise be able to do so.33 Finally, consumers
benefit from employment-based health insurance because they receive health
insurance as tax exempt compensation.34
Employment-based health insurance also has disadvantages. First, the
employer decides which health insurance provider will cover the group.35
While the employer may offer consumers a few different health insurance plans
to choose from, consumers are severely limited in choosing a plan that is best
for their unique circumstances.36 As a result, health insurance providers com-
pete to provide plans that employers feel are best for the employer, rather than
for the individual consumer.37 Second, consumers who want to keep their
health insurance plan cannot do so when changing employment.38 This lack of
portability often creates “job-lock,” where consumers avoid transferring
employment to avoid losing health insurance benefits.39 Finally, households
with two employed members who have access to employment-based insurance
benefits lose significant compensation value because households usually only
participate in one employment-based insurance plan.40
30 Catherine Hoffman et al., Holes in the Health Insurance System — Who Lacks Coverage
and Why, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 391 (2004).
31 Id.
32 William S. Custer et al., Why We Should Keep the Employment-Based Health Insurance
System, 18 HEALTH AFF. 115, 116–18 (1999).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 116–17.
35 Mark Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health Insurance: Weighing the Pros and
Cons, 18 HEALTH AFF. 28, 29 (1999) (“[W]e consider a number of criticisms of the current
system, focusing on one: the fact that employers choose one or a limited set of health insur-
ance options to offer employees . . . so that employees do not have the same ability (or
responsibility) to choose . . . .”).
36 See id.
37 David Leonhardt, How Insurers Do, and Don’t, Compete, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2009,
9:00 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/how-insurers-do-and-dont-com-
pete/.
38 Alan C. Monheit & Philip F. Cooper, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory and
Evidence, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 68, 68 (1994) (“The nonportability of employment-
related health insurance has been recognized as an important shortcoming of the prevailing
system of private health insurance in the United States.”).
39 Id.
40 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: HIGH
COSTS, WIDE VARIATION THREATEN SYSTEM 4 (1992) (“The growth in health care costs
represents a substitution of employee health benefits for cash wages.”).
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For the increasing number of consumers who are not eligible for employ-
ment-based or government health insurance,41 the individual health insurance
market is riddled with barriers to accessing adequate health insurance.42 Indi-
vidual health insurance plans are expensive, and the cost must be borne wholly
by the individual.43 Consumers who purchase individual health insurance plans
do not enjoy any tax exemptions.44 To compensate for increased premiums,
individuals often are forced into plans with fewer benefits, higher deductibles,
and more restrictions.45 Furthermore, in the past and until PPACA becomes
effective in 2014, people with a poor history of health and pre-existing condi-
tions also face significantly increased costs and may even be denied
coverage.46
For consumers who do not qualify for employment-based health insurance
and cannot afford or access individual health insurance, the government pro-
vides insurance coverage through programs like Medicare and Medicaid.47
Unfortunately, many do not qualify for government insurance for various rea-
sons.48 Those who do qualify face greater difficulty finding a doctor who will
accept the insurance because of the government’s history of reimbursing doc-
tors at relatively lower rates.49
As health care costs increase, health insurance providers adjust to maintain
solvency and profitability. To offset increased costs, insurance providers seek
to increase revenue by raising premiums.50 Because premiums continue to
grow faster than wages, insurance providers attempt to moderate the increase in
premiums by increasing deductibles and reducing what is covered by health
insurance plans.51 Insurance providers also attempt to control costs by decreas-
41 See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 22 (“The percentage of people without
health insurance increased to 16.7 percent . . . [and t]he number of uninsured people
increased to 50.7 million in 2009 . . . .”).
42 Hoffman et al., supra note 30, at 392 (“[F]amilies are hard-pressed to find and pay for a
policy in the individual insurance market.”).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. While PPACA makes it illegal for insurance providers to deny coverage based on pre-
existing conditions after 2014, the general cost of health insurance will increase as the
increased risk is spread across the market. This increase in cost will make it harder for
people to obtain adequate health insurance in the individual market.
47 While the government provided health insurance for a record high number of people in
2009, the overall number of people with adequate health insurance has still decreased.
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 24 (“The percentage and number of people covered
by Medicaid is the highest since 1987.”). 1987 was the “first year that comparable health
insurance data were collected.” Id. at 23–24.
48 See Hoffman et al., supra note 30, at 392–94.
49 See Julie Connelly, More Doctors Are Opting Out of Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2009, at F9.
50 Id. See Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults,
2003 and 2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298, w298 (2008) (“As health care costs continue to rise
. . ., efforts to moderate premium increases have led to a shift . . . .” (emphasis added)).
51 Schoen et al., supra note 50. Employers, worried about their own solvency and profitabil-
ity, react to increased premiums by shifting the increased cost of health insurance onto
employees, reducing the number of employees who receive benefits, reducing salaries, or
laying off employees. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 40, at 10–12. This shifting
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ing the reimbursement amounts that doctors receive for performing health care
services.52 Government insurance programs reduce reimbursement rates simply
by setting reimbursement amounts at the level it is willing to pay for services.53
Doctors can accept or reject consumers covered under government programs,
but doctors have no power to change the amount received for health care ser-
vices performed.54 The government sets reimbursement rates low based on the
theory that doctors will increase efficiency to maintain profitability.55 In real-
ity, however, instead of increasing efficiency, doctors simply pass any lost mar-
gin onto consumers with private health insurance, or worse, those with no
health insurance at all.56
Private health insurance companies reduce reimbursement amounts by
negotiating with doctors. Health insurance companies negotiate from a position
of strength because most consumers are covered under private health insurance,
and therefore doctors’ revenue largely comes from health insurance compa-
nies.57 Health insurance companies negotiate with doctors and establish a spe-
cific discounted rate for health care services before doctors provide treatment.58
Doctors who agree to this discounted rate are considered “in-network,” and
insurance companies punish consumers who receive services from “out-of-net-
work” doctors by requiring them to share more of the costs.59 Furthermore,
after a doctor bills a health insurance company for services performed, the
insurance company works relentlessly to lower the amount it must reimburse
the doctor.60
Ironically, an indirect factor that determines the cost of health insurance is
the number of people who lack adequate health insurance.61 When a consumer
of costs led to 25 million people between the ages of 19–24 being underinsured by 2007.
Schoen et al., supra note 50.
52 See Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 648 (2008) (“Insurers (public and
private) negotiate prices for much of the care many patients receive.”).
53 See Ira Burney et al., Medicare Physician Payment, Participation, and Reform, 3 HEALTH
AFF. 5, 9–11 (1984).
54 Jack Hadley, How Should Medicare Pay Physicians?, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.:
HEALTH & SOC’Y 279, 279 (1984).
55 See Karen Davis & Stuart Guterman, Rewarding Excellence and Efficiency in Medicare
Payments, 85 MILBANK Q. 449, 451 (2007) (“Such a system of payment rewards those hos-
pitals and physicians that efficiently produce those units of care . . . because they can pocket
any difference between the fixed price they are paid for each unit and the amount it costs
them to produce it.”).
56 Beverly Cohen, The Controversy Over Hospital Charges to the Uninsured — No Villains,
No Heroes, 51 VILL. L. REV. 95, 110–11 (2006). See generally Allen Dobson et al., The
Cost-Shift Payment “Hydraulic”: Foundation, History, and Implications, 25 HEALTH AFF.
22 (2006); Jean M. Mitchell et al., Physicians’ Responses to Medicare Fee Schedule Reduc-
tions, 38 MED. CARE 1029 (2000).
57 Cortney Kuntze, Comment, Insured Versus Uninsured: The Fight for Equal Pricing in
Health Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 537, 538 (2008).
58 Hall & Schneider, supra note 52, at 648.
59 Kuntze, supra note 57, at 539.
60 See James W. Marks, Prompt Pay Statutes for Physicians’ Billing Claims: An Imperfect
Remedy for a Systemic Problem, 20 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 135, 135 (2004).
61 FAMILIES USA, PAYING A PREMIUM: THE ADDED COST OF CARE FOR THE UNINSURED 15
(2005), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Paying_a_Premium_rev_July_
13731e.pdf.
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fails to pay medical bills, medical providers are forced to recuperate that loss to
remain solvent.62 Medical providers recuperate this loss by charging more for
services to consumers who have adequate health insurance.63 To cover the
increased costs of coverage, health insurance providers pass this cost on to
consumers by increasing the cost of health insurance.64 Unfortunately, the
increase in health insurance causes more consumers to lack adequate health
insurance, and this creates an inflationary cycle for the cost of health care and
health insurance.65
In summary, most consumers gain access to adequate health insurance
through employment-based insurance. For those not eligible for employment-
based health insurance, the individual market is riddled with barriers to acces-
sing affordable insurance. Although some are eligible for a government insur-
ance program, the overall number of consumers who are uninsured or
underinsured has reached a record high. As this number rises, the cost of health
care also increases, thereby increasing insurance premiums. This perpetuates an
inflationary cycle for health care and insurance costs.
C. Selecting a Doctor
To effectively select a doctor, consumers need readily available informa-
tion to compare the price and quality of services among doctors. Today, thanks
to technological advances in communications, consumers can search for and
compare the value of nearly every product or service they wish to purchase.66
However, health care services are a glaring exception to this general rule.67
One commentator succinctly stated, “Medicine is the one capitalist enterprise to
reveal its price tag only after the purchase or transaction is completed.”68 Fur-
thermore, consumers struggle to determine and compare the potential quality of
a doctor’s services.69 Because this information is not readily available, the
health care industry lacks competition based on value; therefore, health care
costs dramatically increase.70
Consumers struggle to compare doctors based on price because doctors do
not disclose specific prices for potential health care services.71 There are three
basic reasons that doctors do not disclose specific prices. First, doctors often
charge different prices to different consumers depending on the consumer’s
62 See id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 13–14.
65 Id. at 15.
66 A variety of organizations offer resources for consumers to research products and ser-
vices. See, e.g., CONSUMERS UNION, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/history/
printable/index.htm.
67 See Howard F. Stein, The Money Taboo in American Medicine, MED. ANTHROPOLOGY,
Fall 1983, at 1, 11.
68 Id. (emphasis omitted).
69 For a classic study of the difficulties associated with consumer comparisons of physician
quality, see Jay L. Lebow, Consumer Assessments of the Quality of Medical Care, 12 MED.
CARE 328 (1974).
70 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7–10, 21, 26–27.
71 Hall & Schneider, supra note 52, at 653–54.
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insurance coverage.72 Second, every consumer is unique and may require dif-
ferent services, which makes it difficult for doctors to formulate specific prices
for health care services.73 Finally, doctors do not regularly compete for con-
sumers based on price, so there is little need to establish and advertise specific
prices for health care services.74
Consumers struggle to compare doctors based on quality because informa-
tion about quality is difficult to find and synthesize. Consumers can investigate
doctors on the internet, but will likely only find general office information.75
Beyond this, consumers often rely on the advice of other doctors, family, or
friends.76 While consumers’ reliance on the opinions of those close to them
helps ascertain quality, it also greatly restricts consumers to a relatively low
number of potential doctors the consumer can compare. Depending on which
doctors accept the consumers’ particular insurance plan, consumers are left
with even fewer options.
In summary, consumers need adequate information to effectively select
and compare doctors based on economic value. Unfortunately, under the cur-
rent health care system consumers do not have access to information regarding
the cost or quality of services provided by doctors.
D. Consumers Often Ignore Value
The majority of consumers77 ignore value because they have no direct
incentive to lower health care costs. Health care costs barely affect most
insured consumers because they do not pay the bulk of the expense for health
care services.78 Without an incentive to lower health care costs, consumers
often disregard price altogether.79 This disregard for price is dangerous because
it removes the consumer as an important check on rising costs. Because con-
sumers normally care about price, producers compete by increasing value.
72 Id. at 657.
73 Id. at 658.
74 Id. at 653–54; see also PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 253–54 (5th ed.
1999).
75 Blue Cross of Blue-ray: Nearly Half of Adults Spend More Time Researching Latest
Gadget Than Their Doctor, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 13, 2011, available at http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/blue-cross-or-blu-ray-nearly-half-of-adults-spend-more-time-
researching-latest-gadget-than-their-doctor-113448289.html.
76 See FELDSTEIN, supra note 74, at 251, 253–54 (discussing factors that may influence a
patient’s choice and how patients have information about physicians).
77 This would include those covered by employment-based health insurance and govern-
ment insurance programs because consumers often pay little to be covered. 55.8 percent of
people were covered by employment-based health insurance in 2009, whereas 30.6 percent
were covered under a government program. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 22, 24.
78 Consumers arguably have an indirect incentive to lower health care costs. As health care
costs increase, insurance premiums and the number of uninsured and underinsured consum-
ers follow. However, this inflationary cycle is so subtle and far removed from the individual
consumer that they respond only after they become powerless to do so.
79 In addition to having no direct incentive to lower costs, consumers may also disregard
costs because they feel powerless to do so. Consumers may feel powerless because they
often have few choices regarding the insurance plan they have or the doctors they can see.
Feeling powerless to affect prices, consumers may simply ignore it altogether.
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Therefore, when consumers disregard health care costs, doctors and insurance
providers will not compete by increasing value.
Consumers who are uninsured, underinsured, or have high cost sharing
plans focus on value because they often have incentives, although limited, to
lower health care costs.80 Unfortunately, these consumers often lack the power
to greatly affect health care costs. First, these consumers do not have the neces-
sary information to compare doctors.81 Second, doctors are often hesitant to
accept these consumers because collecting payment for services performed may
be a greater challenge.82 Finally, these consumers83 realize that by postponing
medical care until the situation becomes serious, they can go to an emergency
room and get free health care because emergency rooms must admit and treat
every person who is critically ill, regardless of ability to pay.84
In summary, most consumers do not focus on value because they have no
direct incentive to lower health care costs. Additionally, those who do have
limited incentives to lower costs ultimately lack the power to greatly affect
health care costs.
E. John and Jane: A Hypothetical Illustration of the Current Health Care
System
After John graduated from law school, he and his wife, Jane, moved
across the country to begin work at Best, Brightest & Associates, a mid-sized
law firm. The firm offered John full health benefits through Insurance Co. and
John and Jane enrolled.
Jane, an accountant, found a job at American Accounting, and her com-
pany also offered generous health benefits. Because John and Jane already had
full coverage from Best, Brightest & Associates, they did not join American
Accounting’s group plan and lost the benefits’ value.
After a few months, John and Jane were excited to find out that Jane was
pregnant. John and Jane wanted the pregnancy to go perfectly, and quickly
sought to find an Obstetrician/Gynecologist (OB/GYN). They first searched the
internet, but only found general office information. They then asked co-work-
ers, friends, and acquaintances to suggest a good OB/GYN. After receiving a
few names, John and Jane again searched the internet to compare those doctors.
Of the doctors who accepted Insurance Co., John and Jane decided to go with
Dr. Baby because her office was conveniently located.
Jane called Dr. Baby’s office and scheduled an appointment, but although
Jane was an accountant and known for pinching pennies, she never asked about
cost. Out of curiosity, Jane had once before asked about a doctor’s price, but
80 See generally Fodeman & Book, supra note 28.
81 See infra Part II.A.ii.
82 See Manoj Jain, Equal Treatment for the Uninsured? Don’t Count on It., WASH. POST,
Oct. 14, 2008, at HE05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2008/10/10/AR2008101002679.html.
83 However, these consumers only make up a minority of the marketplace. See DENAVAS-
WALT ET AL., supra note 3, at 22 (“The percentage of people without health insurance
increased to 16.7 percent . . . [and t]he number of uninsured people increased to 50.7 million
in 2009 . . . .”).
84 See Jain, supra note 82.
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the receptionist responded in vague terms that every patient was different and
did not disclose a price. Since Jane’s insurance would pay nearly the entire bill,
Jane figured the price was unimportant.
Over the next several months, Jane visited Dr. Baby regularly. Dr. Baby
worked with Jane and provided adequate health care. Since Insurance Co. was
paying the bill, Jane was not concerned with the overall costs, and since Jane
was not concerned with costs, Dr. Baby focused almost exclusively on deliver-
ing the best available care. Jane liked Dr. Baby; Jane would refer anyone in
need of an OB/GYN to Dr. Baby.
While Dr. Baby was not concerned about the cost to Jane, Dr. Baby was
concerned about being adequately reimbursed. Dr. Baby had previously agreed
with Insurance Co. to discount the cost of her services by a specific amount.
However, after applying that discount, Dr. Baby also knew that she would
receive only a fraction of the amount she billed to Insurance Co. Furthermore,
Dr. Baby had recently lost money on another patient who did not have adequate
health insurance. Therefore, to obtain a profit and recuperate losses, Dr. Baby
billed Insurance Co. more for Jane’s costs than she expected to receive.
Insurance Co. was also concerned with operating a viable and profitable
business and sought to reduce the amount paid to Dr. Baby. Insurance Co.
recognized that Dr. Baby’s bill was higher than average for the services pro-
vided. Insurance Co. worked relentlessly to lower the amount it was required to
reimburse Dr. Baby. While Insurance Co. successfully reduced the amount
owed, the amount Insurance Co. paid was still higher than average. Insurance
Co. responded to the increased cost by increasing premiums.
The climbing cost of providing insurance benefits in a struggling economy
caused John’s firm to decide to lay off employees. Unfortunately, John was
among those laid off. John found another job at a different firm, Capable Attor-
neys, which also provided John with health benefits, but through a different
insurance provider. However, John and Jane’s coverage was much less than
before, and Dr. Baby did not accept their new plan. Jane was forced to switch
doctors and again struggled to find a doctor.85
In summation, John and Jane received the best available care and were
fully satisfied with Dr. Baby, but were forced to accept a different insurance
plan and select a different doctor. Dr. Baby satisfied a customer enough to
receive future referrals and received enough revenue from Insurance Co. to
85 This hypothetical could be continued to illustrate the inflationary cycle associated with
underinsured consumers:
As health care costs increased generally, Health Insurance Co. increased the premium
charged to customers, including Best, Brightest & Associates, to maintain solvency and prof-
itability. The firm, also concerned with maintaining a viable and profitable business, decided
it needed to reduce operating costs. It was committed to providing health benefits as a com-
petitive advantage over other firms, so to reduce costs the firm decided to lay off one percent
of its attorneys. Having been with the firm only a year, John was among the one percent laid
off. Luckily, Jane continued to work, and John and Jane joined AA’s group plan and enrolled
in Insurance For All, Inc. While John and Jane were still covered, they were underinsured.
Their new plan had a $15,000 family deductible and their income had been greatly reduced.
After an unrelated accident, John and Jane were faced with $20,000 in medical bills. This
cost, added to lost wages and mounting debt, forced John and Jane into bankruptcy. The
doctors would recover the $20,000 they lost by increasing costs.
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maintain a profitable business, but ultimately lost a consumer who was happy
with her services. Insurance Co. maintained solvency and profitability, but had
to work relentlessly with Dr. Baby to lower the amount owed, and had to
increase premiums to cover its costs, which ultimately reduced the number of
its consumers. Overall, health care costs continued to increase and the number
of people adequately covered by health insurance continued to decrease.
III. BETTER SYSTEM: HEALTH CARE EXCHANGES
A. Overview
A health care exchange (“HCE”) is an entity that organizes the health care
market by combining a health insurance exchange (“insurance exchange”) with
a similar health provider exchange (“doctor exchange”) into an online market-
place. HCEs would allow consumers to easily search for and compare insur-
ance plans based on price, quality, consumer reviews, coverage, and
participating doctors. Consumers could also search for and compare doctors
based on price, quality, consumer reviews, accepted insurance plans, geo-
graphic area, and specialty. Furthermore, HCEs would reward consumers for
selecting price-effective doctors and conversely punish the opposite behavior
by imposing discounts or surcharges to consumers’ individual insurance premi-
ums. Ultimately, through market forces, HCEs would drive down health care
costs and insurance premiums while increasing the number of consumers cov-
ered by adequate health insurance.
B. Obtaining Insurance Through an HCE
To succeed, HCEs must incorporate a successful insurance exchange.86
An insurance exchange is an online marketplace that connects consumers,
insurance providers, and other financial contributors (employers, family mem-
bers, government programs, etc.).87 Consumers participating in insurance
86 Currently, Massachusetts and Utah have insurance exchanges, known as Commonwealth
Connector and Utah Health Exchange, respectively. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176Q,
§ 1 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2504 (West 2010). While both insurance
exchanges have similarities, they can also be seen as the two extremes of potential insurance
exchanges. Trip Jennings, NM Considers Models for Health Insurance Exchange, N.M.
INDEP. (June 4, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://newmexicoindependent.com/56303/group-considers-
models-for-nms-health-insurance-exchange. Massachusetts has regulatory powers, whereas
Utah is more market-oriented; Massachusetts relies on an individual mandate, whereas Utah
attempts to grow by attracting consumers with benefits; Massachusetts limits participation of
insurance companies and attempts to control plan benefits, whereas Utah wants all insurance
companies to participate and only sets minimum standards for plan benefits. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 176Q, § 1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-2504. While either insurance exchange
would work as part of HCEs and each state should adopt an insurance exchange appropriate
for that state, this Note will follow many elements of Utah’s exchange because it is more
market-oriented, and more likely to drive down costs through market forces.
87 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues, 37 J.L. MED. & ETH-
ICS 51, 53 (2009) (“Health insurance exchanges are entities that organize the market for
health insurance, much like stock exchanges do for securities or farmers’ markets for pro-
duce.”); Jennings, supra note 86 (“[T]he Utah plan . . . allows workers to pool contributions
from several sources—an employer, government assistance or perhaps money from a
spouse’s contribution from their employer—to have enough to buy a basic plan . . . .”).
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exchanges would receive all the benefits enjoyed by consumers receiving
employment-based health insurance. In addition to receiving financial assis-
tance to obtain coverage, consumers would pool their risk together to lower
overall costs through increased bargaining power.88 Pooling risk could also
eliminate the pre-existing condition barrier for consumers, thereby allowing
consumers with poor histories of health to obtain adequate health insurance.89
Furthermore, consumers would receive health insurance benefits as tax exempt
compensation.90
However, consumers participating in insurance exchanges would not suf-
fer the disadvantages of employment-based health insurance. First, employers
would not choose the insurance plan in which consumers enroll. Rather, con-
sumers would compare numerous plans and choose the one that best fits their
unique circumstances. As a result, insurance providers would begin competing
for business based on what consumers demand, and not what employers want.
Second, consumers could keep their insurance plan when changing employ-
ment.91 This increased portability would largely eliminate the risk of “job-
lock” and consumers would not worry about losing insurance coverage when
changing jobs. Finally, consumer households with two employers who contrib-
ute toward health benefits would not lose compensation value, because the
household could combine contributions from multiple sources to obtain better
coverage or withdraw surplus funds from the insurance exchange as tax-free
income.92
Employers would continue to assist employees in obtaining adequate
health insurance. However, instead of having the burden of shopping for and
selecting one group plan for the entire company, employers would simply con-
tribute an established amount, chosen at their discretion, into the insurance
exchange, where employees can choose the plan that is best for them.93
Employers would continue to receive the same tax benefits for, and continue to
attract employees through, contributions toward employees’ health benefits.94
Employers would further benefit from increased predictability in costs. The tax
88 TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCHANGES AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 2 (2010).
89 See id.
90 Robert E. Moffit, The Rationale for a Statewide Health Insurance Exchange, WEB
MEMO, Oct. 5, 2006, at 2, available at www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/wm1230.cfm.
91 Employees could keep their plan as long as both employers participated in the insurance
exchange.
92 To ensure that employers and employees do not attempt to circumvent income tax
requirements, insurance exchanges should have a maximum contribution allowed.
93 Moffit, supra note 90, at 2.
94 See Lois M. Collins, Utah Health Exchange Growing as More Small Businesses Sign On,
DESERET NEWS (May 30, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700140212/Utah-
Health-Exchange-growing-as-more-small-businesses-sign-on.html; Defined Contribution
Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH HEALTH EXCHANGE, http://www.exchange.utah.gov/
learn-more/defined-contribution-faqs (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); see also Why Use the
Utah Health Exchange?, TAX FREE PREMIUMS COMPLIANCE BLOG (March 15, 2011), http://
www.taxfreepremiums.com/blog/?p=230.
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benefits and increased predictability of cost would likely drive smaller employ-
ers to contribute toward employees’ health benefits, even if only a little.95
Empowered to choose, consumers could search for and compare insurance
plans that are best for their unique circumstances. Consumers could select
insurance plans based on price, consumer reviews, coverage, and participating
doctors.96 Consumers would also be aided in their search by a value rating
attached to each participating insurance plan.97 A good value rating would
attract consumers, therefore increasing an insurance provider’s sustainability.
Insurance providers, eager to operate a sustainable and profitable business,
would compete to increase their value rating by decreasing price, increasing
coverage, or otherwise improving the value of insurance plans they offer.
In addition to using value ratings to compare insurance plans, consumers
could contribute to value ratings and provide detailed reviews. Each consumer
could give insurance plans an overall rating that would factor into an insurance
plan’s value rating. Because purchasing an item is akin to voting in the market-
place,98 an insurance plan’s value rating would also increase based on the total
number of consumers electing that particular insurance plan. Additionally, con-
sumers could also write detailed reviews about their experiences with insurance
plans, both good and bad, that other consumers could use to gain information.
Doctors would also affect an insurance plan’s value rating. First, an insur-
ance plan’s value rating would increase as more doctors accept that plan. This
would incentivize insurance providers to attract doctors to a plan by treating
doctors fairly. Second, an insurance plan’s value rating would include the aver-
age value rating of doctors99 who accept that plan. This incentivizes insurance
providers to treat doctors with high value ratings better than those with low
value ratings. Thus, insurance providers will avoid non-productive negotiations
with doctors who have high value ratings, and welcome productive negotiations
to lower claims submitted by doctors with low value ratings. If a doctor with a
low value rating drops the insurance plan, the plan is rewarded with a higher
rating; if the same doctor improves her own value rating, the plan is rewarded
and the insurer is incentivized to reward the doctor.
95 Employers’ contributions would remain tax exempt. Furthermore, if an employer contrib-
utes nothing toward an employee’s health benefits, but elects the insurance exchange as the
company’s group plan, the employer can receive tax benefits for any income employees
apply toward their premium.
96 Employers would choose a default plan on the HCE for those consumers unwilling or
without desire to select a plan.
97 The insurance value rating would factor in the following: consumer reviews, number of
consumers in the plan, number of participating doctors, average doctor rating of participating
doctors, number of successful bad faith claims, and any other numeric factor that could
represent quality.
98 This is often called “dollar-voting,” where individuals determine the most desirable prod-
ucts by selecting those products to purchase. See Peter Lindsay, Exposing the Invisible
Hand: The Roots of Laissez-Faire’s Hidden Influence, 37 POLITY 295, 297 (2005).
99 See infra Part III.A.ii. Similar to an insurance plan’s value rating, a doctor’s value rating
reflects the overall quality of a doctor, including price charged and value delivered for health
care services.
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Along with the potential advantages, insurance exchanges also face poten-
tial challenges. One potential challenge is adverse selection.100 Adverse selec-
tion is an economic term often associated with insurance that describes a
market condition, also known as “death spirals,”101 that occurs when consum-
ers choose a product “on a basis that increases the cost of providing that prod-
uct.”102 All health insurance markets potentially face the risk of adverse
selection, but because insurance exchanges pool consumers’ risk together, often
guarantee coverage regardless of health, and may be subject to increased regu-
lations, insurance exchanges are at a heightened risk of adverse selection since
higher risk consumers are more likely to participate in the insurance exchange
rather than the outside market.103 Ultimately, if the insurance exchange pro-
vides coverage for more high-risk consumers than the outside market, the
health insurance premiums within the insurance exchange would increase to
cover the added costs associated with these consumers. If premiums in the
outside market are less expensive for healthy consumers, healthy consumers
would leave the insurance exchange, resulting in the insurance exchange
becoming more saturated with higher risk consumers, leading to further
increases in premiums. Further increases in premiums would lead to more con-
sumers leaving the insurance exchange, and the spiral could continue causing
the insurance exchange to fail.
Previous efforts to provide health insurance in a similar manner show that
in order to avoid adverse selection, insurance exchanges must attract and main-
tain the necessary level of participation by health insurance providers, employ-
ers, and consumers, known as “critical mass.”104 While states are just
beginning to create insurance exchanges, in the past states have tried similar
programs such as small group purchasing cooperatives and purchasing
alliances.
In 1992, California created a small-business purchasing cooperative
known as PacAdvantage.105 Because PacAdvantage attracted 150,000 consum-
ers at its peak,106 many considered PacAdvantage successful.107 However, in
2006, health insurance provider Blue Shield of California decided against offer-
ing insurance through PacAdvantage because the product was unprofitable; this
100 TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCHANGES: EIGHT DIFFICULT ISSUES 8 (2010) (“[T]he greatest threat facing exchanges is
adverse selection.”); SARAH LUECK, CTR ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES
SHOULD STRUCTURE INSURANCE EXCHANGES TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE SELECTION 1 (Adverse
selection “could prevent the [insurance] exchanges from operating effectively.”).
101 Id. at 3.
102 RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 299 (2005). When consumers purchase
health insurance based on prior health problems or increased risk of future health problems,
the cost of providing health insurance increases. See id. Health insurance providers created
exceptions to coverage for pre-existing conditions so consumers could not simply wait until
they were sick to purchase health insurance to protect against adverse selection. See id.
103 See generally JOST, supra note 100; LUECK, supra note 100.
104 See generally LEUCK, supra note 100.
105 DAVID DRANOVE, CODE RED: AN ECONOMIST EXPLAINS HOW TO REVIVE THE HEALTH-
CARE SYSTEM WITHOUT DESTROYING IT 182 (2008).
106 LUECK, supra note 100, at 2.
107 See ELLIOT K. WICKS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTH INSURANCE PURCHASING
COOPERATIVES 3 (2002).
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left only two health insurance providers in the pool.108 Offering coverage
through PacAdvantage became unprofitable because employers with lower-risk
employees left the pool to obtain less expensive coverage in the less regulated
outside market.109 As employers with the lowest-risk employees left,
PacAdvantage raised premiums as high as the law allowed, which drove more
employers to leave the pool.110 Because PacAdvantage failed to maintain the
necessary level of insurance providers, employers, and consumers,
PacAdvantage suffered from adverse selection and ultimately failed.111
In 1994, Texas also attempted to pool small employers into purchasing
groups by forming the Texas Insurance Purchasing Alliance.112 Initially, the
alliance fulfilled its purpose to provide health insurance coverage for small bus-
iness at reduced costs.113 However, the alliance struggled to attract employers,
and mostly attracted employers with higher-risk employees who faced
increased costs in the outside market.114 Because the alliance was saturated
with higher-risk groups, health insurance providers increasingly withdrew until
ultimately the alliance failed.115
Insurance exchanges within the HCEs can avoid adverse selection by
reaching critical mass. Insurance exchanges can attract insurance providers by
offering a large number of consumers within the insurance exchange. Insurance
exchanges can attract consumers by offering benefits that are not enjoyed in the
outside market. States can ensure that insurance exchanges avoid adverse selec-
tion only if the federal government does not burden states with onerous and
unnecessary restrictions placed on insurance exchanges. While adverse selec-
tion is a threat that must be addressed, states can overcome adverse selection in
insurance exchanges the same way that other insurance plans have consistently
overcome adverse selection: by attracting consumers to participate.
In summary, insurance exchanges would expand the number of people
covered by adequate health insurance; would empower consumers to choose a
health insurance plan tailored to their needs, keep that plan when changing
employment, and capture lost compensation value; and would reward insurance
plans and providers for increasing value delivered to consumers. Based on
these and other benefits, insurance exchanges can overcome adverse selection
and succeed.
108 DRANOVE, supra note 105, at 182–83.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.; LUECK, supra note 100, at 2.
112 WICKS, supra note 107, at 3.
113 Cappy McGarr, Op-ed., A Texas-Sized Health Care Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009,
at A31.
114 Id.
115 Id. (The Texas Insurance Purchasing Alliance “never attained a large enough market
share to exert significant clout in the Texas insurance market.”); WICKS, supra note 107, at 3
(“The Texas Insurance Purchasing Alliance . . . cover[ed] only about 1,000 firms and 13,000
people at its height.”). Nearly identical stories can be told about efforts in Florida, North
Carolina, and Colorado. Id.
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C. Selecting a Doctor Through a Doctor Exchange
While insurance exchanges contribute to the HCEs’ success, HCEs must
also incorporate doctor exchanges.116 A doctor exchange is a website that
empowers consumers to effectively search for and compare doctors by provid-
ing consumers with information to make an informed decision. To assist con-
sumers with this information, doctor exchanges, like insurance exchanges,
would distill this information into value ratings.
The first factor of a doctor’s value rating would be price. The price used in
the value rating would be the average amount billed per patient.117 Using the
average amount billed per patient would give consumers a general reference
point to compare doctors even though the cost of each patient varies depending
on medical condition. Also, using the average amount billed versus amount
collected would incentivize doctors to bill insurance companies an amount that
is closer to the doctors’ actual expected revenue. As a doctor lowers the amount
billed for health care services, that doctor’s value rating would increase.
However, value does not equate to “cheap,” and it is not in consumers’ or
society’s interest to incentivize doctors to reduce costs without restraint. There-
fore, a doctor’s value rating would also include factors to determine quality,
such as consumer reviews, number of patients, number of malpractice suits, and
the standard deviation of amount billed to patients.118 As the quality of a doc-
tor’s services lowers, that doctor’s value rating would decrease.
Doctors’ value ratings would incentivize doctors to increase value by
decreasing costs and increasing quality. To decrease costs without reducing
quality, doctors would perform a cost-benefit analysis of the services they pro-
vide. Doctors are in the best position to perform a cost-benefit analysis because
they hold the most information and are largely emotionally detached from
health care decisions.119 Many times, the decision may not concern whether or
not to provide a procedure, but rather the most cost-effective way to provide
that procedure.120
A good value rating would reward doctors with increased consumers and
increased sustainability as a business. Doctors, eager to operate a sustainable
and profitable business, would compete to increase their value rating by
116 Doctor exchanges would only involve non-emergency doctors. Emergency doctors
would be excluded because a consumer’s choice is drastically altered in emergency situa-
tions; e.g., society should not expect a father to coldly perform a cost-benefit analysis when
faced with the potential loss of his child.
117 Doctors would also include the cost of any services performed by a third party that the
doctor referred the patient to receive (e.g., labs, x-rays, diagnostic tests, etc.).
118 The standard deviation would ensure that doctors treat patients with varying degrees of
need; patients with low costs, high costs, and those in between. The greater the standard
deviation, then the higher the doctor’s value rating would be.
119 See Hall & Schneider, supra note 52, at 650–53 (explaining why patients feel powerless
to shop for health care services).
120 A great example would be a surgery. If the surgery requires a surgical device, the doctor
could reduce the surgery’s cost by comparing devices and using the least costly alternative.
If, on the other hand, a surgical device was “nice” but ultimately too expensive and unneces-
sary, some doctors would forego using the device to increase their value rating and competi-
tive advantage. This would lead other doctors to follow suit as their value rating would be
adversely affected.
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decreasing price, increasing quality, or otherwise improving the value of health
care services they provide. As noted earlier, a good value rating would also
reward doctors with an improved relationship with insurance providers.
In summary, doctor exchanges would empower consumers to effectively
search for and compare doctors. The increased transparency and competition
would incentivize doctors to increase the value of the health care services they
provide by reducing costs and increasing quality. As a reward for increased
value, doctors’ practices would gain increased sustainability and profitability
and doctors would enjoy an improved relationship with health insurance
providers.
D. Consumers’ Incentive to Focus on Value
While insurance and doctor exchanges provide the tools for consumers to
effectively select insurance plans and doctors, the HCEs would provide con-
sumers with a motivating purpose. Without a motivating purpose, consumers
would continue to disregard value altogether; if consumers do not focus on
value, the incentives for insurance providers and doctors would disappear.
Therefore, the HCEs must incentivize consumers to focus on value.
HCEs would incentivize consumers to focus on value directly and indi-
rectly. Directly, consumers would get a discount on their individual insurance
premium for selecting a doctor with a high value rating.121 Conversely, con-
sumers who select a doctor with a low value rating would be assessed a
surcharge.122 While each member of a group policy would pay the insurance
provider the same premium amount for insurance coverage, the HCE would
combine the total surcharges and distribute the combined amount proportion-
ately as discounts to those who qualify within each group.
Indirectly, HCEs would reward consumers for focusing on value by lower-
ing a group’s overall health care costs. If the consumers in a group consistently
selected doctors with high value ratings in greater proportion than doctors with
low value ratings, the group’s health care costs would go down. The decrease
in health care costs associated with the group would result in decreased
premiums.
In summary, HCEs’ reward system would incentivize consumers to focus
on value by rewarding consumers for doing so. As consumers focus on value,
insurance providers and doctors are incentivized through the HCE to increase
the value of services. As the participants all focus on increased value, health
care costs and insurance premiums decrease.
E. John and Jane: Hypothetical Illustration of HCEs
John and Jane moved across the country to begin work at Best, Brightest
& Associates. The firm contributed $1000 per month toward an insurance plan
121 Some might also argue that those in the group that made not choices, i.e., never incurred
costs from doctors’ services, should get a discount, others would argue that might increase
the amount of people foregoing adequate care. That debate will be left for others to
determine.
122 Both the discount and surcharge would be proportionate to the deviation from the aver-
age doctor rating. In other words, the higher the rating, the bigger the discount; the lower the
rating, the bigger the surcharge.
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on the state’s HCE. John and Jane accessed the insurance exchange and chose a
plan from Affordable Insurance (AI) that cost $1000 and suited their circum-
stances well.
Jane also found a job at American Accounting. The company contributed
$500 per month toward an insurance plan on the state’s HCE. John and Jane
decided to stay with AI and received the $500 per month surplus in their HCE
account tax-free.
After finding out that Jane was pregnant, John and Jane logged into their
HCE account and searched in the doctor exchange for OB/GYNs in the area
who accepted their insurance plan. Jane, a penny-pincher, was eager to find a
doctor with a high value rating so they could qualify for a discount off their
insurance premium. John wanted a doctor with good customer service and low
patient wait times. John searched through several customer reviews and found a
few doctors that fit their needs. Together, John and Jane agreed to visit Dr.
Baby because she had both a high doctor rating and good customer reviews.
Over the next several months, Dr. Baby worked with Jane and provided
adequate health care. Jane visited Dr. Baby regularly, but because Jane’s preg-
nancy was low risk, Dr. Baby saw Jane less than other patients. Dr. Baby per-
formed ultrasounds and several tests, but, based on Jane’s circumstances,
reduced the number of tests she ordered. When the time for delivery came, Dr.
Baby suggested a reputable and cost-effective hospital and delivered the baby.
Jane liked Dr. Baby so she logged into the HCE, awarded Dr. Baby a high
consumer rating, and wrote a detailed and positive review.
Dr. Baby was concerned about collecting a sufficient amount to operate a
viable and successful business and increasing her value rating to attract more
patients. Dr. Baby billed Jane’s insurance company (AI) for the services she
performed. Because Dr. Baby had a high value rating, she knew that it was
beneficial to AI’s value rating that she accepted its insurance plan. Dr. Baby
also wanted to maintain her high value rating, so instead of inflating the amount
she billed to AI, Dr. Baby billed AI the amount she expected to receive. The
lower amount billed to AI, together with Jane’s positive review, increased Dr.
Baby’s value rating.
AI was also concerned with operating a viable and profitable business.
Because Dr. Baby billed a reasonable amount, AI did not need to reduce the
amount to remain solvent or profitable. AI avoided working relentlessly to
lower the amount owed to Dr. Baby because it would be unproductive and
negatively affect its value rating to do so. Because the amount Dr. Baby billed
AI was reasonable, AI was able to lower premiums to John and Jane’s group
plan.
While the costs of health care and insurance benefits decreased, the econ-
omy continued to struggle, and John was laid off. John quickly found another
job at Capable Attorneys. In addition to John’s salary, Capable Attorneys pro-
vided John with a defined contribution of $500 toward his health benefits on
the state’s HCE. While it was less than the $1000 he received before, when
combined with the $500 contribution from Jane’s employer, it was enough to
allow John and Jane to maintain insurance through AI (the insurance of their
choice), and Jane continued to see Dr. Baby (the doctor of her choice).
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In summation, John and Jane were empowered to select the health insur-
ance that best fit their circumstances, were assisted in locating a quality doctor,
were rewarded for selecting a quality doctor, and were enabled to keep the
health insurance and doctor they wanted after changing employment. Dr. Baby
was able to operate a viable and successful business, be rewarded for her qual-
ity and value (by keeping Jane as a client and attracting more consumers with
an improved value rating), and obtain greater leverage over her ability to col-
lect from the insurance company. The insurance company, AI, was able to
lower premiums while maintaining solvency and profitability, and because it
provided adequate coverage and treated Dr. Baby well it was rewarded with
keeping John and Jane as clients, attracting more consumers, and improving its
value rating.
Under the improved system created through HCEs, health care costs
would decrease and the number of people adequately covered by health insur-
ance would increase, which would lead to overall improved financial stability.
IV. THE ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
Because HCEs would be comprehensive and affect consumers, doctors,
and insurance providers, both federal and state governments must participate in
creating and maintaining HCEs. The federal government should require all
states to establish and maintain an HCE. First, each state’s HCE would include
an insurance exchange. Congress should give states wide latitude to establish
and maintain an insurance exchange according to the particular circumstances
of each state. Second, each state’s HCE would incorporate the federal doctor
exchange into its HCE. Finally, each state would administer the finances of its
HCE, including but not limited to: collecting contributions, distributing pay-
ments for insurance premiums, and applying discounts and surcharges based on
selected doctors.
The federal government should ensure that each state acts to solve the
problem of rising health care costs, ensure that each state has the freedom to act
according to that state’s particular circumstance, and establish a federal doctor
exchange. The federal government should ensure that each state acts to solve
the problem of rising health care costs by requiring each state to establish an
HCE. To ensure that states have the freedom to act according to the particular
circumstances of each state, the federal government should limit laws, rules,
and regulations pertaining to HCEs to those that are essential to equity and
ultimate success. Finally, the federal government should establish and maintain
a doctor exchange, and require all doctors123 to participate to ensure that all
states are treated fairly.124 In establishing the federal doctor exchange, the fed-
eral government should specify the factors, with the weight associated with
each factor, involved in determining doctors’ value ratings. The federal govern-
ment should also establish rating areas based on the number of doctors within
that area.
123 Doctor exchanges would only involve non-emergency doctors.
124 Without doing doctor exchange on the federal level, some states may be tempted to
loosen requirements for doctors in doctor exchange, thereby enticing doctors to move from
states with stricter requirements.
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V. CONCLUSION
The current health care system is broken. There are many opinions on how
to fix the health care system, but none can succeed without using market forces
to lower health care costs. Market forces will only work, however, if the gov-
ernment fixes the market by realigning the incentives of each participant of the
health care system to lowering health care costs. HCEs properly realign the
participants’ incentives to lower health care costs by combining insurance
exchanges with doctor exchanges and incentivizing consumers to focus on
value.
HCEs, through market forces, would drive down health care costs and
insurance premiums while increasing the number of consumers covered by ade-
quate health insurance. Insurance exchanges would provide consumers with all
the benefits of employment-based insurance, including shared cost, pooled risk,
and tax benefits. Unlike employment-based insurance, consumers in insurance
exchanges would choose their own plans, have increased portability of their
plans, and capture lost compensation value from health benefits. Insurance
exchanges would reward insurance providers that increase value with increased
consumers, and would incentivize insurance providers to treat doctors fairly.
Doctor exchanges would empower consumers with the tools and informa-
tion needed to search for and select doctors based on value. Doctor exchanges
recognize the unique position doctors have in performing a cost-benefit analy-
sis on health care services, and would reward doctors who decrease costs and
increase value. Doctors who effectively focus on value are rewarded with
increased consumers and improved relationships with insurance providers.
Finally, the HCEs’ reward system incentivizes consumers to focus on
value by rewarding consumers who do so. Consumers who select doctors with
high value ratings receive discounts on their individual insurance premiums,
while those selecting doctors with low value ratings pay a surcharge. As con-
sumers in a group select doctors who have high value ratings, the group’s insur-
ance premium will decrease.
